Social Science Research Council

CGP-SSRC SEMINAR SERIES
Soft Power: National Assets in Japan and the United States
February 25-26, 2005
Conference Report

Michael Fisch

This document reports on the ninth seminar held under the auspices of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). The seminar series was established in 1996 to assemble interdisciplinary groups of researchers and professionals to examine global and bilateral (US-Japan) issues. The workshop described herein, entitled “Soft Power: National Assets in Japan and the United States,” was held at International House, Tokyo, February 25-26, 2005. Convened by Watanabe Yasushi of Keio University, the meeting brought together 17 experts from Japan and the United States. A major theme of the project of which this workshop was a part is to investigate to what extent popular culture, international higher education, and civil society are national assets in terms of the paradigm developed by Joseph Nye in Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, Public Affairs, 2004). Other topics include the ways in which soft power enables the United States and Japan to attain their policy objectives and the measurement of soft power impacts. Michael Fisch of Columbia University prepared this summary report of the discussion.

The SSRC administers the seminar series with funding provided by the Center for Global Partnership. The views expressed in this publication are summaries of the comments by participants and should not be considered a representation of the views of either the CGP or the SSRC.

Introduction

According to Joseph Nye, soft power “is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” and “arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies” (p. x). Although Nye’s central concern is the nation-state, by distinguishing soft power from hard--military or economic--power, he situates considerable power with such non-state actors as the culture industry, educational institutions, and non-profit/non-government organizations. Yet, as a concept that aspires to encompass such disparate facets of society, soft power’s specific units of analysis, applications, and even identifying characteristics are only vaguely defined. Hence, the question remains: What exactly is soft power and how is it measured and applied? Is it advantageous to think in terms of soft power or is the concept another example of a discourse producing its own object of inquiry?

The United States–Japan relationship provides a good forum for exploring the notion of soft power. With its rich history of diplomatic, cultural, educational and economic exchange, the bilateral ties promise to reveal numerous manifestations of the effects of soft power or, by contrast, the absence of its effects.

Analytical Overview

Aoki Tamotsu from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies opened the workshop by suggesting that soft power not be regarded solely as cultural power. Since it is increasingly difficult for nations to conceal what happens within their borders in this era of global information networks, Aoki said, every aspect of a nation becomes a potential determinant of its soft power. The behavior of the prime minister and fellow politicians or even spectators at soccer matches is just a few examples. Nye’s theory of soft power might have only limited application to Japan since it follows a binary structure that assumes the presence of hard (military) power. A more appropriate term for Japan is “cool power,” which is the central power of a nation that does not -- or rather chooses not to -- possess hard power. The willingness of Japanese soccer fans to cheer for the teams of other nations, the international appeal of its popular culture, the humanitarian activities of the Self Defense Forces, as well as more traditional cultural forms, are all examples of “cool power.” Yet this “cool power” remains largely untapped and must be developed through equal modes of cultural exchange with other countries, especially in East Asia. By becoming an economic and cultural superpower while developing its “cool power,” Japan can hope to raise the level of mutual cultural awareness in Asia and dissipate anti-Japanese sentiments.

Michael Auslin from Yale University set forth several key definitions and questions to which the discussion would return over the course of the workshop. Suggesting that public diplomacy is only one, albeit essential, part of soft power, he pointed to the need to establish a clearer understanding of the nature of soft power. In the realm of state diplomacy soft power is part of a planned policy or action aimed at a foreign government or population. By contrast, in fields such as popular culture soft power is passive and often the unintentional by-product of sales campaigns initially aimed at a domestic market. This inherently “accidental” nature of soft power makes it extremely difficult to ascertain beforehand what will be accepted abroad and thus what is potentially a soft-power resource. It is next to impossible to predict what will be become part of “cool Japan.”

Whether as public diplomacy or as popular culture, soft power cannot be separated from the specificity of historical moments that are its condition of possibility, said Auslin. To identify and eventually harness soft power as a resource, a historical method that looks at the evolution of cultural relations from unregulated encounters to highly organized exchanges is critical. The underlying assumption is that soft power is the product of numerous fluid variables and almost never the result of a set plan. Soft power within nascent bilateral relations differs greatly from the soft power operating between nations with a long history of cultural exchange.

In the ensuing discussion, Nakano Yoshiko from the Department of Japanese Studies at the University of Hong Kong asked whether people consuming products as manifestations of “cool Japan” are driven by an attraction for Japan or simply are drawn to its cultural products. She noted that the popularity of Japanese popular music and television dramas in East Asia has not inhibited expressions of antagonism towards Japan. Anne Allison from Duke University questioned whether the concept of “cool power” was not encumbered by Nye’s theoretical conflation of nation with culture, which she suggested was incommensurable with actual consumption practices.

These issues drew attention to a problem that would remain central in the discussions. Although the papers by Aoki and Auslin demonstrated that soft power is not strictly the prerogative of the state apparatus, Nye does not adequately explain the role of non-state actors in the formulation and application of soft power. Moreover, as Sugiura Tsutomu from the Marubeni Economic Research Institute observed in the case of pirated media seemingly promoting Japan yet hurting its economy, soft power in image currency does not always translate into positive economic currency for the nation.

Auslin thought Nye’s argument was haunted by a “so-what question.” What is the point of soft power and of trying to understand culture as something that is important to the state? The strength of Nye’s work is that it tries to develop an alternative to the traditional conception of power as military force, said Auslin. Soft power moves an object, facilitates public diplomacy, and transforms reality, however, it does so through indirect force and cannot be easily quantified, charted, or intentionally directed.

Lawrence Repeta of Omiya Law School observed that soft power exists in tension with hard power and implies a reallocation of power away from the elites who control military and economic authority. While hard power is the prerogative of statesmen or leaders imposing their will, ordinary people play a much bigger role in soft power. The ultimate goal of soft power is the promotion of peace and cultural exchange, said Repeta, and the level of peace and the absence of military force can measure its success.

William G. Crowell, a former U.S. State Department public affairs officer, noted that soft power is similar to what former U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles termed “peaceful evolution.” Drawing attention again to the role of perception, Crowell said Nye does not consider the effects of soft power from the position of the country against which it is applied or entertain the possibility that soft power as anything but positive.

Japanese Pop Culture

Drawing on her research on Japanese popular culture in Hong Kong, Nakano hypothesized the possibility of a “cumulative effect” in the formation of soft power. In Hong Kong the cumulative effect is the result of long-term exposure to Japanese popular culture and is manifest in a cultural literacy of and an acceptance and appetite for new Japanese products. Methodologically, the cumulative effect demands that an analysis of soft power always be considered along a diachronic axis. A cumulative effect of soft power can be seen in Hong Kong in the slow replacement of negative postwar stereotypes by favorable and up-to-date views of Japanese lifestyles. However, in line with the equation separating nation from culture set out in the first session, Nakano warned that one cannot be overly optimistic about the effects of culture since many people maintain animosity toward the Tokyo government and its foreign policy while at the same time embracing Japanese popular culture. Still, she suggested that in the long term J-pop might lead to a more multi-dimensional and positive view of Japan.

Concurring with Sugiura’s statements on the pirated media, Nakano noted that illegal copies of Japanese dramas and software have been pivotal for the diffusion of Japanese culture in Hong Kong. By moving through black-market channels, such media avoid import limits set by local governments and are more affordable. This suggests that accessibility rather than inherent attractiveness also determines the popularity of a country’s cultural product.

Allison posited a shift in the United States between younger and older generations in the manner in which Japanese popular culture is received and questioned the significance of this phenomenon for the nation. In the past Japanese popular culture products exported to the United States were de-coded of specifically Japanese cultural references to make them acceptable to an American audience. By contrast, now Japan is no longer effaced but rather eagerly sought after and accepted as a marker of something “cool.” This shift is reflected in a generational difference whereby contemporary children demonstrate a savvy literacy in Japanese and other foreign popular cultures while many adults remain parochial and unreceptive of cultural difference. The significance of this shift for Japan and the United States, however, remains uncertain. Exposure to Japanese culture in childhood might account for a later interest in Japan and desire to take Japan-related courses. At the same time, the “Japan” that is registered via popular-culture products may have only a limited relation to the real nation and have more currency as fantasy. The irony inherent in the latter possibility is that the moment at which Japanese popular culture finally becomes acceptable in the United States is also the moment at which the actual national referent of that culture seems to be receding. However, the fact that Japanese and other popular cultures, whether bound to a real national referent or not, have gained popularity among youth may also indicate a de-centering of American culture from its hegemonic position.

Sugiura observed that despite an economic slump in Japan for more than a decade, Japanese popular culture has recently gained heretofore-unimagined recognition and popularity overseas. Evidence of this phenomenon is immediately apparent from a search on Google for Japanese pop icons and products. Although Nye’s theorization of the relation between soft power and culture is convincing, said Sugiura, the concept should also be understood from a business perspective. For example, in trying to gauge the significance of Japan’s popular culture as a vehicle of soft power, its impact in terms of actual economic activities, especially over a long-term period, must be measured. This requires calculating the size of the domestic cultural market, the growth of the creative industry in Japan, its influence abroad, the economic influence of culture, and the relationship between cultural power and corporate profits.

In view of the role ascribed to piracy in the dissemination of Japanese popular culture, many participants thought governments should exploit this channel to create soft power rather than suppress it in the name of intellectual property rights. Japanese producers might follow the American movie industry’s example and lower the price of authentic media in order to compete with knock-offs.

There was no clear consensus about whether a nation’s popular culture translates into soft power for public diplomacy, what exactly drives the success of any specific item, or the long-term effects of popular culture. David L. McConnell from the College of Wooster warned that Nye’s theory was encumbered by its inability to posit nations as anything but singular entities with easily identifiable interests. Discussion of the link between popular culture and policy should disaggregate the nation-state and understand it as a multitude of competing interests, even within a single government, he said. Whose interests any item of popular culture serves, and its capacity as soft power, are almost impossible to specify. Auslin added that there is no definitive historical evidence in the Japan-U.S. relationship to support the idea that long-term mutual cultural exposure, or cumulative effect, has played a positive role in actual relations.

Kondo Seiichi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought that popular culture generated soft power when it could be said to have an impact. Although the impact is impossible to quantify, it is important for governments to work with producers to identify what and why something is popular. In a preview of his own hypothesis, Kondo suggested that Pokemon was attractive in other nations because of an inherent message associated with its Japanese cultural specificity. Repeta remarked, however, that governments and policy-makers should not interfere with producers of popular culture, who only succeed when allowed to operate in a free market of creative ideas. Allison said what was being described as freedom of production also had to do with mass production and serialization, which is conducive to a particular logic of capitalism and is not about cultural specificity. The attractiveness of a particular pop-culture item, its resilience over time, and its adaptability follow a commodity paradigm and have more to do with price, distribution, production costs, target audience, and advertising, she explained.

Perception

Watanabe suggested that to understand American soft power in Japan it is instrumental to look at how and why anti-American perceptions are formed. Categories such as anti- or pro-American, or anti- or pro- Japanese, must be questioned, he said, noting that it is important to ask why greater cultural exposure does not always translate into soft power. Nye’s notion that the working class is usually more pro- American than the upper class might not be applicable to Japan, where the meaning of class is contested. There is often a correlation between anti-Americanism and Japan’s own self-image, Watanabe said. Discourses and sentiments about America often perform as a mirror for Japan’s society; talking about America is really just another way for Japanese to talk about Japan. How people gain the information that helps them formulate pro- or anti-American sentiments is also crucial, especially when news is marketed as a commodity. He asked how China’s expanding economy and influence might affect Japanese feelings toward the United States. Will the notion of a Chinese cultural threat bring anti-American conservatives in Japan, who are also suspicious of China, closer to Washington?

Kondo observed that since, according to Nye, hard power diminishes soft power, a government has to anticipate a corollary decline in the latter when it uses the former. Rising anti-Americanism in Japan is to be expected given the war in Iraq. The question is how the equation will balance out in the end if Washington succeeds in its mission. Perhaps the concern about America’s soft power in Japan is being overstated, said Kondo. It can also be argued that anti-Americanism in Japan is not necessarily nationalism, although it could someday be exploited by right-wing elements. He cautioned that because students are expressing nationalistic sentiments does not mean they are ready to fight and die for Japan.

The Japan Exchange and Teaching Program (JET) is often held up as a shining example of how to produce positive perceptions of Japan and may be the closest approximation of a concrete manifestation of Nye’s theory. McConnell argued, however, that the diverse factors surrounding JET’s incipience as well as the various results must be questioned. JET was not launched under a single, clear initiative to generate soft power, and it was forced to accommodate the agendas of three different ministries. After an uncertain beginning, it eventually bore fruit in the form of a “ripple effect” whereby now many Americans in Japan-related professions are JET alumni. The positive results are not unequivocal; some of the most eager participants became disillusioned by their exposure to Japan. People were attracted to JET for a variety of reasons, including the exotic allure of Japan’s culture, the strength of its economy, and the prospect of going abroad.

Imata Katsuji from CSO Network suggested that JET is more than just a government program; its impact also takes the form of personal relationships developed in the context of cultural exchange. Such relationships lead to international cooperation in a framework that does not necessarily involve the state. A study of JET should consider this dimension and bring to the fore these complexities and nuances. The concept of soft power may be an analytical tool to facilitate such an inquiry.

Education

Philip Altbach from Boston College joined the panel on education via videoconference. The wide-ranging dialogue moved from the structure of education in the United States and Japan to efforts to define what makes higher education an element of soft power.

In a discussion of research carried out with Patti McGill Peterson from the Council for International Exchange of Scholars, Altbach pointed to the role of English as well as diversity and diversification as attractive structural aspects of the U.S. educational system. At the same time, he suggested it is challenged by increased educational capacities, particularly at the graduate level, in other countries (such as China and India), lower educational fees for students who matriculate in their own countries, and the difficulty of obtaining visas to the United States since the terrorist attacks in September 2001. U.S. institutions will most likely remain the most attractive option for general and not just technological related studies, he thought.

Although the diversity of U.S. higher education is a reflection of American society, the system is exportable because it is the gold-standard model for educational institutions, to the point where internationalization in education is commonly thought of as “Americanizing,” Altbach said. The question of whether branch U.S. institutions in foreign countries are deemed less attractive due to a perceived drop in quality in comparison to the home institution spurred considerable comment. Kondo observed that students are attracted to campuses in the United States not only because of the academic standards but also because they want the experience of living there.

According to Yonezawa Akiyoshi from the National Institution for Academic Degrees and University Education, in order for a country to attract people to its educational and training institutes, it must have hard power in the form of a strong economy. Analysis of international education must distinguish between initiatives undertaken by government and those driven by market-oriented forces. The latter dominates the Japanese system. Of the approximately 120,000 foreign students in Japan, ninety percent are from Asian countries, an unfortunate imbalance, he said. Part of what makes the Japanese educational system attractive is the traditional cultural values that have been disseminated within the formal school curriculum. The system’s goals should be to attract students from other countries and produce global citizens.

Imata responded that inability to attract Western students should not be considered a systemic failure. Japan should strive to draw East Asian students and create a pan-Asian consortium that would form future business networks. Nakano disagreed with the latter point, observing that both geographically and historically there are insurmountable differences among universities in Asia.

In contrast to Yonezawa’s macro view, Ellen Mashiko from the Tokyo Foundation proposes to do three case studies of Japanese universities that demonstrate Japan’s soft power in their attempt to become transnational. Her framework encompasses content and process, outcomes and inputs, and ties into Nye’s argument by asking how institutions can not only attract but also enhance relationships in the long term. Individual universities and not governments are responsible for the decision to become transnational; the number of non-government-sponsored students in Japan is an indicator of success at transnationalization, she said. The effort to be transnational must be articulated and should build on the strengths of a university and include as many stakeholders as possible. The goal should be enduring long-term relationships that benefit individuals, universities, and nations.

Does the intention to make a university more attractive contradict Nye’s conceptualization of soft power as the product of inherent character? Several participants wondered what constitutes the soft-power element in the above discussions. According to Nye’s conceptualization, cultural exchange at the level of higher education is soft power if it produces statesmen who serve the interest of government policy. But can the same be true if it produces business executives who are more concerned with profits than the nation? Several participants favored short-term exchanges rather than the traditional study-abroad format of a year (or longer), but others disputed the efficacy of such programs for soft power.

Civil Society

Imata and Kuroda Kaori from CSO Network Japan contended that despite Nye’s focus on the state, previous discussions had illuminated a non-state dimension of soft power. Is soft power a useful analytic tool if it can be a vehicle both of the state and of civil society?

Since the end of the Cold War and as a result of new information technologies, civil societies have become more powerful then ever before. Even groups with limited funds can tap into the resources offered by information technology and achieve tremendous global recognition. The connectivity facilitated by technology has also given rise to a global consciousness -- not a single voice but a global awareness. Where does the state fit in this paradigm, especially in relation to NGOs? Kuroda suggested that following a Wilsonian tradition many NGOs view humanitarian aims and foreign policy as compatible. Similarly, an NGO can use its soft power independently of government and gain wide recognition due to its ability to work without government backing. Referring to Allison’s paper, she added that an NGO, like Pokemon, benefits from its de-nationalized status.

Yonezawa wondered if there is an insurmountable contradiction between the international character of the NGO and Nye’s notion of soft power. Moreover, if the objective of a Japanese NGO is to be international, how does it promote soft power for Japan, and what remains that is “Japanese” other than being based in Japan? Regarding the former, Kuroda responded that in contrast to NGOs elsewhere, many in Japan target limited areas and issues so as to develop unique relationships with a local population. The downside of this strategy is that it generates only limited soft power. Addressing the latter point, Crowell cited evidence that an NGO and the state can work together in a symbiotic and mutually beneficial relationship. An NGO can represent a side of the country that the government cannot, and can work in areas otherwise hostile to officialdom. Kondo added that a government is sometimes too big to deal with everyday issues and too small to solve international problems alone. Imata warned that although in Japan there has recently been a convergence of interests between NGOs and the government, official funding could also create inexpedient power relations.

Repeta explained that usually civil society organizations and individuals, not governments, lobby for access to information, and noted that the relation between soft power and freedom of information is complicated. Even if Nye’s premise that soft power is mainly a state asset is accepted, he said, the state cannot create and disseminate soft power on its own. Who really holds the soft power in the end? Especially in the realm of information dissemination, soft power can upset or contradict the state.

Regarding the quality and control of mass media, Repeta said freedom of speech is chaotic: all information, some of it biased and wrong, is allowed in the hope that the truth will emerge from the total picture. This contrasts with centralized government media, or with what may be happening in the United States with the emergence of large media conglomerates. Disagreeing with the assumption that freedom of speech is necessarily more assured under powerful mass media, Yonezawa suggested that the impulse is then towards a commodification of information in a manner not always consistent with explication of the truth. Repeta agreed, adding that private corporations are not sufficiently accountable to a freedom of information standard. Mark Davidson of the United States Embassy, Tokyo, recalled that in the early 1990s requests for data about the U.S. freedom of information law ranked first or second among inquiries to the American Center in Tokyo.

Public Diplomacy

Kondo said the medium through which cultural expressions are transmitted is instrumental in determining their potential to generate soft power for public diplomacy. He hypothesized that the essential character of Japanese culture and the secret of “Japanese cool” is the articulation of an alternative to modern rationalism. While improving the standard of living for many, modernity has failed in its promise to improve the quality of life, he said. There is an excessive preoccupation with elements of modernity, such as efficiency, dichotomy, and the conquest of nature. Japanese cultural products, like Miyazaki Hayao’s anime films, offer a different way to understand the world by promoting respect for nature and acceptance of ambiguity rather than a clear division between good and evil.

While inclined to agree with Kondo’s hypothesis concerning the attractiveness of Japanese culture, Kuroda suggested that Japanese have acquired the skills to make themselves understood in a logical manner. Other participants questioned Kondo’s hypothesis. Repeta asserted that Japanese culture is Japanese since it is produced by Japanese and not because of any essentialist element. In many East Asian countries the appeal of Japanese products is their representation of modernity and not of traditional culture, added Nakano.

William Morgan from the United States Embassy, Tokyo, concurred that the medium through which soft power is transmitted is crucial, adding that the articulation and reception of diplomatic policy should be seen as an on-going dialogue between two countries over a period of time. Although the tendency is to view soft power as the opposite of hard power, the use of soft power can be intense and confrontational in unfriendly environments. Soft power is achieved by either aligning public policy with prevailing opinions or by changing the prevailing opinion of your policy. The former method is less aggressive, but can lead to an avoidance of innovation and make diplomats slaves to public-opinion polls.

Speaking as a historian and former practitioner, Crowell offered a brief history of the term “public diplomacy.” The term was initially developed in the1960s to designate the role of the press and other non–governmental interactions of private groups and interests in one country with those of another and the impact of these transnational processes on the formulation of policies and the conduct of foreign affairs. Initially a non-governmental activity, public diplomacy has come to be regarded as the province of government. Public diplomacy must also be distinguished from public affairs, which designates activity aimed at encouraging understanding and support for governmental polices among a domestic audience. Public diplomacy is not propaganda, which is information deliberately propagated to help or hurt a group, regardless of whether it is true. Public diplomacy is divided into information-related activity and cultural relations; in Nye’s formulation the former is relegated to the sphere of communication while the latter concerns such long-term activities as cultural and education exchange programs.

Many U.S. programs that produced soft power were developed under Cold War imperatives, Crowell said. The terrorist attacks in September 2001 show the need to re-establish some programs that were cut after the Cold War; yet one must ask if the public-diplomacy apparatus constructed for that era would be effective in today’s world. Concurring with Kondo, Crowell suggested that attention must be paid to how these programs are transmitted and how they are received by foreign audiences.

Substituting for Agawa Naoyuki from the Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C., who prepared a paper but was unable to attend the meeting, Frank Baldwin noted that the paper discussed the use of soft power by Japan in the United States, especially from September 2001 to the spring of 2005. Citing public-opinion polls to show that American perceptions of Japan have significantly improved, Agawa credited the change to bilateral educational programs, the success of Japanese baseball players with major league teams, the alignment of Japan and U.S. foreign policy, and Japan’s public diplomacy. The claim of universal acceptance of “Japan cool” in the United States, however, was undermined by the class and gender differences among culture consumers worldwide, as noted in one panel. Agawa’s contention that the success of the Japanese Self Defense Forces overseas qualifies them as a form of soft power seemed to be a contradiction in terms, unless their non-combat role renders them essentially different from other military forces.

Conclusion

Conference participants grappled with Nye’s concept of soft power on numerous fronts, particularly the central correlation between soft power and the nation. Many noted that to Nye, soft power is ostensibly the prerogative of a nation. Although he regards everything from a nation’s popular culture to its legal code as potential assets, ultimately soft power is wielded through the state apparatus and redeemed in the form of diplomatic persuasion. In Nye’s terms, soft power is a positive attribute that if cultivated properly can increase a nation’s international standing, economy, and security.

The meeting accepted the general proposition that soft power is a national attribute and a tool for diplomacy, yet questioned its applicability to U.S.-Japan relations or the specificity of Japanese culture. An antidote to U.S. administrations overly reliant on military power is not necessarily pertinent for a Japan infused with pacifist ideology. Some participants approached the notion of soft power as convenient language to persuade government to fund or endorse their agendas, a strategy that acknowledges soft power as the product of a discourse and seeks to exploit it for causes not immediately tied to a national agenda. How to quantify soft power so as to better harness its potential, cultivate its components, or wield it as positive rhetoric emerged as a primary concern.

Another stream of thought considered soft power a discursive construct that diverts attention from other, and perhaps more convincing, determinants. The success of a nation’s cultural products or institutions has more to do with marketing strategy, the serial logic of capitalist commodity structure, or the diffusion of a specific technological apparatus than with an inherent national cultural attribute.

Despite difficulties raised by the inclusiveness of attributes and partial explication of theory in the Nye paradigm, participants found soft power a stimulating framework for their research interests. Watanabe asked the presenters to revisit Nye’s thesis when revising their papers. Discussion then turned to such practical questions as submission of revised research plans, which were due by late April.

The second workshop to critique draft chapters for an edited volume is scheduled for March 2006 in Cambridge, MA.